

Dear Partners,

Year-to-date, our long/short equity growth strategy returned **-15.18%** net of fees, and our long-only equity strategy returned **-1.49%**. This was compared to the S&P 500 TR of 15.25%.

Since inception in March 2017, our long/short equity growth strategy has annualized returns of 44.11% net of fees, compared to the S&P 500 TR of 16.98% over the same time period. Since inception in July 2012, our long-only equity growth strategy has annualized returns of 34.84% net of fees, compared to the S&P 500 TR of 15.93% over the same time period.

Please see below for results since inception.

#### Long/Short Equity Growth Strategy Net Performance

	June	YTD	1 Year	2 Year	3 Year	Inception*
Strategy	18.19%	<b>-15.18%</b>	37.29%	114.88%	44.53%	44.11%
S&P 500 TR	2.33%	15.25%	40.80%	23.04%	18.68%	16.98%

\*3/1/2017

#### Long-Only Equity Growth Strategy Net Performance

	June	YTD	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	Inception*
Strategy	10.81%	<b>-1.49%</b>	68.06%	48.93%	47.14%	34.84%
S&P 500 TR	2.33%	15.25%	40.80%	18.68%	17.65%	15.93%

\*7/1/2012

\*\*Individual investor performance may vary. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please see attached fact sheet and composite presentations for additional information and disclosures\*\*

As of the end of the quarter, our core holdings, which accounted for over 90% weighting of the long book, were: TSLA, SPOT, SHOP, ABNB, and AMZN. Notable sells in the quarter included NFLX and TME. The drawdown and volatility in prices also gave us entry points into 2-year LEAP call options in our long/short fund, focused on names in our core holdings. Some of the action and news flow we saw on TSLA over the last six months was similar to what we observed in the first six months of 2019, when we saw a 40% drawdown in the equity from January to June before a significant run in the second half of the year and into 2020. (While that of course does not mean the same thing will happen in 2021, we tend to believe the Twain quote that “History never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme.”)

The options market for high-growth business models tends to be fairly price (and thus not worth the premium), but occasionally—especially during bouts of volatility and when the market is panicking—we are able to scoop up two-year call options at a fraction of what we think they should be worth. We’ll never put more than a few points of our total capital into our options book, but when we spot an attractive risk/reward scenario with a 2-year outlook that has the potential for a significantly levered return, we like the upside optionality it creates for the Partnership and our strategies. Historically, we’ve had some notable successes on these trades in the past, and we’re hopeful we may see a similar outcome.

Our shorts, which have worked against us throughout the year so far, are much more heavily diversified, but focused on sectors of the market that we believe face terminal decline: Firms across the oil and gas industry, combustion-engine-based business models, brick and mortar retailers, and so on. Though many of these “value” names had a strong showing in the first half of 2021, we think their long-term outlooks are in decline. As of right now, very few of our short positions exceed even 0.5% weighting, but we are gearing up for some potential opportunities on the short side—particular across name in the legacy automotive industry—when the time is right. We’ll be patient there.

Throughout the quarter, you may have noticed that we averaged into a significant position in Airbnb (ABNB). Though the stock has been a relative underperformer since its February highs, we are highly confident about the company’s prospects and its ability to generate meaningful compounded returns over time.

Some history: We have been following Airbnb’s journey for several years, long before the company went public earlier this year. (In fact, nine years ago, in November 2012, Eric profiled the company for *Inc.*: [“Airbnb Is Changing Travel.”](#))

Whenever we underwrite a new investment, we look for a few key attributes that help us determine the potential long-term value of a business, as well as its risks. In particular, we focus on management (Are they founders? Do they have skin the game? Are they playing the long game?), addressable market size (How big is the opportunity?), its relative growth and creativity to expand (Are they constantly innovating to make the product better for their customers?), margin expansion (Where can we find operating leverage in the model?), its status in the industry (Are they the dominant player? Can they take market share from incumbents?), business risks (What are we missing? Are customers dissatisfied? What do employees say?) and probably a dozen more elements that are critical to our process. It’s only *then* do we take out the pencils do the valuation work.

In short, ABNB fulfills pretty much every element of a business model we’re attracted to: First, it’s highly scalable marketplace-based business model that unites buyer and seller with observable flywheel effects. (This is an important observation, in that the platform creates significant economic value for millions of hosts who rely on Airbnb, which in turn attracts new hosts who identify the opportunity, which creates more inventory, which turn attracts more travelers, which attracts more hosts, and so on.) Second, it has a global focus with significant opportunities to expand its operating leverage; Third, its management—which is still founder-led—stands out to us as long-term thinkers capable of handling crisis, which the team demonstrated throughout the pandemic by dropping operating costs and turning the business into a more efficient, lean organization. (Like Churchill said: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”)

We also think there are also several other intangible tailwinds both benefiting (and enabled by) Airbnb. In particular, the very nature of travel is changing: Longer stays, more flexible remote work policies, and so on. As its marketplace matures, we see significant similarities to our position in Shopify: An international focus led by managers who understand that, in land-grab environment, focusing on its unique value proposition for its sellers—i.e. keep costs low, improve the platform with additional features, etc.—takes precedent over short-term earnings. In other words, we like businesses that play the long game.

Unlike Airbnb, Shopify drove positive attribution this past quarter. Still, we think this opportunity is still vastly undervalued over the long-term.

Last year, in the Q2 2020 Investor Letter, we wrote a bit about the similarities and differences between AMZN and SHOP, but concluded they “both display winner-take-most dynamics in their respective domains.” We still believe that thesis is true: E-commerce is still, relatively speaking, in its early days. Despite the pandemic push, e-commerce retail still represents less than 15% of overall retail sales, per latest [Fed data](#).

What that means, in practice, is that the opportunity for low-end disruption (i.e. create a scalable backbone for sellers to launch e-commerce business cheaply) is an enormous, underappreciated opportunity to create new economic value. Shopify is growing its GMV at high velocity (114% YoY in its most recent quarter to over \$37 billion) but it’s a tricky business to value—which is good. We like tricky valuations. Our research process looks out several years into the future, which is really the only way to value a business properly—especially in a disruptive environment. (Trying to look at potential short-term earnings or even a simple price-to-sales multiple is not a good way to model out valuations on Shopify.)

When thinking about a position like Shopify, we view them as generational company—much like AMZN—that is building the global infrastructure to enable small and medium-sized business to transact online, and, most importantly, keep their unique identity and branding.

Where AMZN optimizes for efficiency, SHOP optimizes for experience. The scale of this opportunity is vast, and Shopify’s reach is wide. The focus—much like ABNB—is keeping costs low for sellers, attract new vendors, improving the ecosystem for merchants. “The rebels are winning,” Shopify president Harley Finkelstein said recently (in a quote we liked so much we made it the title of this letter). “We are betting on a different vision of the future of commerce. We are making it possible for every business to present their brand in their own unique way. A stark contrast to selling on a centralized marketplace.”

Some important key insights to think about regarding a position like Shopify—but really our entire portfolio:

- Earnings ≠ Value in a landgrab environment
- It’s a winner-take-all landscape (the Internet is the catalyst)
- Business is a competition to deliver the best value proposition
- Volatility is not risk

As investors, we are simply trying to grow our pile of assets over time. Simple—but not easy.

Both Tesla and Spotify underperformed in the quarter, but we maintain our high conviction in the long-term thesis on each business model. Much like art or writing, investment research is a continuous process—it never really ends. Prices can move in either direction in any given quarter, but our advantage often comes from knowing the businesses so well that short-term fluctuations in pricing shouldn’t affect our decision-making. On high conviction positions, this patience is often rewarded, which is why research is so valuable to our process.

Eric and Dan spoke a bit about the concept of “optionality” regarding both SPOT and TSLA on the recent Good-Investing podcast ([link here](#)), but the gist of the idea of this: We believe both companies have multiple ways to win. We have written extensively about both companies in the past, but just to offer some brief updated views:

- Tesla is in a class of its own. What many in the market seem to (still) not understand is that Tesla is not a car company so much as a complex manufacturing firm—with significant recurring software potential—growing, in our view, at a targeted rate of 50-100% YoY over the next several years. Unlike any other automotive firm in existence today, Tesla alone is a vertically integrated hardware and software business developing state-of-the-art manufacturing techniques that will revolutionize the auto industry (i.e. its Giga Presses, 4680 cells, etc.). It is a generational company and we anticipate it will eventually be the largest company in the world. Many of the conventional narratives around competition displacing Tesla’s lead are fundamentally flawed, and the many headlines surrounding Tesla’s approach to autonomy are frustratingly superficial. (As an aside, we highly recommend watching Andrej Karpathy’s, Tesla’s head of AI, his recent presentation from June: [“Tesla details its self-driving Supercomputer that will bring in the Dojo era”](#))
- On Spotify: Spotify has 350+ million users and 158 million paid users—and multiple catalysts for improved operating leverage over time. While the headline focus tends to revolve around margins and lack of current earnings, few on Wall Street seem to recognize the long-term potential: SPOT is focused on a land-grab of users while simultaneously innovating on the platform to create new margin-heavy lines of revenue (e.g. its podcasting advertising platform, live events, virtual events, direct monetization, etc.). Last May, when SPOT was trading under \$200, we [wrote](#) that Spotify should be a \$500 stock. We maintain that view.

Clearly, performance this year has been lackluster, but nothing particularly out of the ordinary. We’ve gone through periods like this before, and we almost certainly will again in the future. We don’t claim to be market-timers—our advantage comes with time and duration. Historically, drawdowns have created solid entry points for investors to add additional capital in our strategies. Of course, the future is uncertain, but what we do know is that the businesses that we own are meeting (and often exceeding) our internal expectations, and we like the momentum heading into 2022 and beyond.

At a high level: We could not imagine a better investment landscape for stock selection over the next decade: Lots of change, lots of upheaval. We’re also seeing plenty of misinformation and short-term, superficial research out of Wall Street—which is excellent. Efficiency means businesses get priced at fair value. If everything is efficient, we lose our edge. The consequence of all this chaos, however, can be short-term volatility.

This is core to our belief structure as a firm. And it’s why we think the next decade could provide such an attractive return profile for concentrated strategies. Traditional Wall Street investment analysis tends to value businesses by looking backwards. But all value is created in the future. And that future, we believe, belongs to the innovators. Not the incumbents.

One of the more fanciful tales being told right now is that companies like Exxon are “pivoting” to renewables (see [here](#) for a recent story about an Exxon lobbyist admitting that the oil company has no intention to pivot), and that General Motors and Ford are “reinventing themselves” as electric vehicle manufacturers. (We are short both.) Over the last 6 months, especially during this recent “rotation from growth to value,” we think the market is making a critical error: It’s significantly underestimating the potential for many established firms—the incumbents—to face obsolescence in the next several years.

Because the market tends to focus on short-term noise, it often misses the longer-term existential issues for businesses around the world. And we think there are many—especially across the energy industry (where many incumbents have been disastrously slow to move away from fossil fuels) and the combustion engine-based automotive industry (that is just now waking up to the terrifying reality that they are not prepared for the future of electric transportation). And it's not just that the incumbents are slow to adapt—which they are—but that we think there will only be increasing consolidation in a small handful of “winners” across the industrial landscape.

In previous decades, the market share among businesses in a specific sector tended to be relatively distributed among several firms. This made sense: That was a result of a relative lack of transparency, regional tribalism, personal relationships, and so on. But if all information was readily accessible—if customers knew *exactly* which business offered the best value proposition—market share would quickly consolidate into the top company. This is happening now. The principal agent of this change? The Internet.

Some 20 years ago, the Internet became the catalyzing force for this era of disruption we are living through today. The Internet created an ecosystem of transparency where customers could easily distinguish which business offered the best value proposition. Everyone is connected. No one wants second-best.

This dynamic has created force function—an imperative—for how investors must think about valuation frameworks, but for now, let's just focus on the core of the issue: The new economic and industrial reality, as we see it, is shaped by winner-take-all dynamics. Informally, we call this the “One Room Hypothesis.” When everyone is connected, there is little reason for 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> place finishers. There are no intermediaries. Everyone is linked. There are quick responses. Less cycles. And most importantly: winner takes the goods.

We have seen elements of this play out across the Search landscape (i.e. Google) and across the smartphone segment (i.e. Apple). But we increasingly believe this dynamic will roil new sectors like energy, transportation, retail, entertainment, and so on. It's an up-for-grabs business environment, and the economy is being reimaged.

The theme of last quarter's letter was all about getting into position. We can't predict what prices will do this quarter or the next, but what we can say with a near certain degree of certainty is this: It is imperative to get into position for the next decade of industrial consolidation. Hyper-disruptive companies are threatening the legacy incumbents at accelerating speed. Like Harley says, “The rebels are winning.”

Amidst this paradigm shift, our credo is simple: Investors must get in position. When innovation is about to be realized, and when fabulous opportunity is in sight, we have our own mandate: To get our partners in position. To *fully* participate in innovation.

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In Q2, we sold our last remaining NFLX lots after first purchasing shares in 2014. Frankly, we believe our entry and exit makes a good case study for how we think about building a position over time, and ultimately exiting.

When we first bought NFLX in 2014, this was a common headline we recall seeing in 2014 and into 2015:

# Netflix Is An Obvious Short If You Can Ride Out The Bubble

Aug. 11, 2015 2:32 PM ET | **Netflix, Inc. (NFLX)** | AMZN, DIS, DISH | 139 Comments

In the early days of our position, NFLX was a very volatile position, with regular 10%+ swings in either direction. While that sort of volatility can make many uncomfortable, it was attractive to us as investors. Why? It told us the market still didn't know how to properly value the opportunity. Initially, that's an element that attracts us to certain companies—complexity in valuation. Not all complex companies will perform nearly as well as NFLX, of course, but stable, simple-to-understand companies don't provide much asymmetric upside if the market already has it figured out.

In the early days of our NFLX position, we recall that many on Wall Street seemed to hate the stock—they deemed it structurally unprofitable, a loser to the studios, etc.—but they failed to see how, over the long-term, NFLX was attempting to build a powerful free cash flow machine with a magnificent global opportunity. Reed Hastings and his team deserve all the credit in the world for sticking true to their long-term mission. So, why did we finally sell?

In essence, we believe the company began to trade at parity with its intrinsic value—i.e. where price meets value—which is ultimately where our edge begins to decay.

If a stock is priced rationally, then upside is limited. And, given other opportunities we see in the market, we believe our fund's capital is better deployed into higher conviction, higher-upside companies. These companies may be more volatile (i.e. TSLA, SPOT), but we also believe that's an indication the market is still figuring out how to value them. We learned a great deal from our years studying the NFLX model, and we'll continue to follow the evolution of the company. In our experience, however, it's worth pointing out that the most contrarian or divisive companies where opinion diverges—these are the companies to pay *most* attention to.

Another position we mostly exited over the quarter was Tencent Music (TME). We've long admired Tencent Music—China's largest music streaming company—because of its similarities to SPOT and its dominant status in the audio industry. It's a company with roughly 840 million users with 72 million paid users (growing at ~30% YoY). We like the multiple monetization opportunities it presents, from live virtual events to audiobooks to premium membership. At its core, it's a healthy, growing business.

Unfortunately, the market is filled with curveballs. During Q2, TME and many other Chinese technology firms (IQ, VIPS, etc.) got swept up in the liquidation of Archegos Capital, which severely impacted their share prices. (There were also increased regulatory concerns coming from the Chinese government.) Both factors have made investing in Chinese equities more complicated, at least in the short-term. TME

was a relatively small position for us, but we decided to exit the equity position in May (although we kept our LEAPs) to focus capital elsewhere until we can get more clarity on the situation. In general, much like March 2020, when we lose visibility on a position, we like to reduce our exposure, which limits our risk.

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Winding down here: This quarter, prices overall didn't go our way. But we rest easy knowing that we own extraordinarily innovative business models, run by world-class operators, who we believe are all poised for a decade-long run of sustained growth. In our view, each of the businesses we own are deeply complex organizations with ample upside optionality.

To find future value, you have to look forward—to the future. And over the long-term, we're hugely bullish on this market and the opportunity it presents to compound out extremely attractive returns. More often than not, it takes patience—and perseverance—but we're still in the early days of our journey.

As always, if you have any questions for us, contact Philip Bland, our Director of Investor Relations.

Sincerely,

Worm Capital

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Arne Alsin – Founder, CIO + Portfolio Manager  
Zak Lash, CFA – COO  
Daniel Crowley, CFA – Director of Portfolio Management  
Eric Markowitz – Director of Research  
Philip Bland – Director of Investor Relations  
Emily Bullock – Head of Compliance

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### Firm Description

At Worm Capital - we don't think outside the box - we created our own box. We challenge every convention and the status quo. We think and invest differently than our peers. We are drawn towards messy, complicated sectors of the market that are difficult to understand - and even more difficult to accurately price. There is an abundance of misinformation and propaganda published daily and it's our duty to our investors to verify or reject based on our own independent, organic research and diligence process. The next decade provides opportunity for concentrated stock picking and the time is now to get into position.

### Strategy Summary

Research-driven, growth-oriented, and concentrated long-term equity strategies targeting innovative, disruptive firms across multiple industries, including: Energy, Transportation, Commerce, Entertainment and Information Technology. The strategies seek long-term capital appreciation by investing in a concentrated portfolio of best ideas. There is no limitation or restriction on the industry or market capitalization of investments held or targeted.


The long-only strategy typically invests in 5-10 publicly traded equity securities and does not employ leverage.

The long/short strategy typically invests in the same equity securities as the long-only strategy, however, also utilizes short equity and strategic option positions as well. Gross and net exposures are variable depending on market developments, specific long and short opportunities, and updated macro-outlooks, among other potential factors, however, will typically be net long.


### Investment Summary

<b>Company</b>	Worm Capital, LLC
<b>Company AUM</b>	286M USD
<b>Long/Short AUM</b>	254M USD
<b>Long-Only AUM</b>	32M USD
<b>Minimum Investment</b>	5M USD
<b>Management Fees</b>	Long/Short: 2%, Long-Only: 1.5%
<b>Performance Fees</b>	Long/Short: 20%, Long-Only: 10%
<b>Liquidity</b>	Quarterly
<b>Lockup</b>	2 Years
<b>Highwater Mark</b>	Yes
<b>Administrator</b>	NAV Consulting, Inc.
<b>Auditor</b>	EisnerAmper LLP
<b>Legal Advisor</b>	K&L Gates LLP
<b>E-mail</b>	info@wormcapital.com
<b>Website</b>	www.wormcapital.com

### Long/Short Equity Growth Strategy



### Long-Only Equity Growth Strategy




### Long/Short Equity Growth Strategy



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEAR
2021	8.06	-9.78	-14.79	-0.25	-13.40	18.19							-15.18
2020	67.75	8.32	28.55	-11.42	-7.88	21.35	8.86	28.50	-16.05	-7.16	25.68	18.12	274.34
2019	-0.15	0.06	-6.43	-8.60	-15.81	8.06	-3.55	-9.05	-4.71	26.05	5.79	30.46	13.04
2018	27.59	2.97	-10.24	10.18	-1.26	15.87	-12.23	6.20	-6.15	1.77	2.42	-7.76	25.03
2017			1.82	5.32	3.04	0.04	1.70	2.95	-7.09	10.21	-5.72	-2.83	8.57

### Long-Only Equity Growth Strategy



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEAR
2021	6.04	-6.76	-6.04	3.06	-7.15	10.81							-1.49
2020	26.63	3.57	-9.01	17.27	4.83	21.68	12.65	26.26	-11.22	-5.28	25.06	14.05	204.54
2019	8.45	1.23	-1.40	-0.76	-13.23	11.37	-0.06	-6.43	-0.76	14.25	3.95	12.87	29.15
2018	21.15	2.19	-7.70	6.96	2.89	9.65	-5.13	7.26	-4.02	-6.30	2.19	-8.83	17.57
2017	11.03	0.32	4.03	6.25	3.94	-0.22	2.15	1.23	-1.05	6.78	-0.40	0.31	39.39
2016	-13.90	-3.49	7.19	3.04	8.14	-4.33	4.33	0.36	3.29	2.82	-5.50	3.36	3.14
2015	-1.91	4.49	-4.15	10.84	3.28	1.78	12.62	-4.05	-3.64	10.55	5.00	-2.53	34.83
2014	-7.72	5.79	-5.01	-4.47	-0.15	2.88	-1.59	2.60	-2.26	3.26	5.20	-4.80	-7.12
2013	5.03	-0.27	3.45	-0.01	8.69	-3.52	4.40	-2.91	9.64	2.53	6.47	8.73	49.89
2012							2.36	3.13	3.29	0.03	3.74	5.95	19.88

### Disclaimer

Past performance is not indicative of future results. Performance shown are monthly net returns for each strategy since inception. Please see attached Composite Presentations for each strategy for additional information and disclosures.

**WORM CAPITAL, LLC**  
**LONG/SHORT EQUITY GROWTH**  
**COMPOSITE DISCLOSURE PRESENTATION**

Year End	Total Firm Assets (USD Millions)	Composite Assets (USD Millions)	Number of Accounts	Annual Net Performance Results Composite	S&P 500 Total	Composite Dispersion	Composite 3 Yr. Std. Dev.	Benchmark 3 Yr. Std. Dev.
2021**	286	254	1	-15.18%	15.25%	N.A.1	60.50%	18.26%
2020	346	315	1	274.34%	18.40%	N.A.1	59.80%	18.53%
2019	88	77	1	13.04%	31.50%	N.A.1	N.A.2	N.A.2
2018	102	93	1	25.03%	-4.38%	N.A.1	N.A.2	N.A.2
2017*	115	13	1	8.57%	15.00%	N.A.1	N.A.2	N.A.2

\*Composite and benchmark performance are for the period March 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017

\*\*Composite and benchmark performance are for the period January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021

- Information is not statistically meaningful due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the composite for the entire period.
- The three-year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite net returns and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36-month period. The three-year annualized standard deviation is not presented for the period due to less than 36 months of composite and benchmark data.

**Long/Short Equity Growth Fund Composite:** includes a private fund managed by Worm Capital, LLC, which seeks a positive, above average absolute return over a diverse set of market environments by investing in a concentrated portfolio comprised of long and short equity investments and strategic options positions. There is no limitation or restriction on the industry and market capitalization of investments held or targeted. Long positions are equity investments, or derivatives thereof, identified as potentially exhibiting superior and sustainable growth compared with the broader market. Short positions are equity investments, or derivatives thereof, identified as potentially exhibiting inferior or negative growth prospects compared to the broad market due to specific adverse events, deteriorating fundamentals, and/or momentum considerations, among other potential factors. The goal of short equity positions and long put option positions is to minimize equity market volatility, provide efficient portfolio management along with downside protection, and potentially contribute to additional return generation. The strategy does not have a long or short bias mandate. Gross and net exposures are variable depending on market developments, specific long and short opportunities, and updated macro outlooks, among other potential factors. Put and call options may be more volatile than the underlying security it is tied to and can expire worthless. Leverage is utilized through the shorting of securities, and short sale cash proceeds may be used to purchase additional assets. Portfolios within this composite are highly concentrated and will have more stock specific risk and potentially lower correlation with the benchmark than a fully diversified strategy. This strategy may also be more volatile than the benchmark or a fully diversified strategy. The benchmark is the S&P 500 Total Return Index. This index is a market-value weighted index that measures the total return, including price and dividends, of 500 leading companies in leading industries in the U.S. economy. It is not possible to invest directly in this index. The Long/Short Equity Growth Composite inception and creation date is March 1, 2017.

Worm Capital, LLC ("Worm Capital") claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Worm Capital has been independently verified for the periods October 1, 2016 through December 31, 2020. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedure for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Long/Short Equity Growth Composite has had a performance examination for the periods March 1, 2017 through December 31, 2020. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Worm Capital is a SEC registered independent investment adviser registered in accordance with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill of training. More information about Worm Capital, including investment strategies and objectives can be found in the firm ADV which is available upon request. A list of composite and pooled fund descriptions are also available upon request.

Results are based on fully discretionary fund managed by Worm Capital. The performance is reflective of what an investor would have received if they invested at the inception of the fund. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, and capital gains. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile. Composite returns represent investors domiciled in the United States. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any particular security and you should not assume that any security, sector, or holding discussed are or will be profitable, or that recommendations Worm Capital makes in the future will be profitable or equal the performance herein. Worm Capital reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of all management fees, incentive fees, applicable fund expenses and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance is calculated by accruing fees and expenses monthly. The annual composite dispersion presented is the standard deviation calculated for the composite the entire year. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

The fee schedule for the composite includes a 2.0% management fee in addition to an annual 20% incentive fee subject to a high- water mark. These, in addition to recurring fund expenses like audit and administration fees, are accrued monthly. WRC-20-08

## WORM CAPITAL, LLC

### EQUITY GROWTH COMPOSITE

#### DISCLOSURE PRESENTATION

Period	Total Firm Assets (USD Millions)**	Composite Assets (USD Millions)	Number of Accounts	Annual Net Performance Results Composite	S&P 500 Total Return	Composite Dispersion	Composite 3 Yr. Std. Dev.	Benchmark 3 Yr. Std. Dev.
2021***	286	32	1	-1.49%	15.25%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	37.37%	18.26%
2020	346	32	1	204.54%	18.40%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	37.62%	18.53%
2019	88	11	1	29.15%	31.50%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	24.04%	11.93%
2018	102	9	1	17.57%	-4.38%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	22.03%	10.80%
2017	115	58	53	39.39%	21.83%	1.62%	18.59%	10.07%
2016	84	72	55	3.14%	11.96%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	19.40%	10.74%
2015	93	76	69	34.83%	1.38%	5.56%	17.95%	10.62%
2014	71	59	61	-7.12%	13.69%	2.17%	N.A. <sup>2</sup>	N.A. <sup>2</sup>
2013	73	59	51	49.89%	32.39%	5.34%	N.A. <sup>2</sup>	N.A. <sup>2</sup>
2012*	36	25	31	19.88%	5.95%	N.A. <sup>1</sup>	N.A. <sup>2</sup>	N.A. <sup>2</sup>

\*Composite and benchmark performance are for the period July 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012.

\*\* Total firm assets presented prior to 10/1/2016 are those of Alsin Capital Management, Inc.

\*\*\*Composite and Benchmark data are for the period January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021

1 – Information is not statistically meaningful due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the composite for the entire period.

2 - The three-year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite net returns and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36-month period. The three-year annualized standard deviation is not presented for 2012 through 2014 due to less than 36 months of composite and benchmark data.

**Equity Growth Composite:** is comprised of a private fund managed by Worm Capital that seek long-term capital appreciation by investing most of its assets in a concentrated portfolio comprised of approximately 6-10 equity securities identified as potentially exhibiting superior and sustainable growth compared with the broad market. There is no limitation or restriction on the industry and market capitalization of investments held or targeted. This strategy is highly concentrated and will have more stock specific risk and potentially lower correlation with the benchmark than a fully diversified strategy. This strategy may also be more volatile than the benchmark or a fully diversified strategy. Leverage is not used. The benchmark for this strategy is the S&P 500 Total Return Index. This index is a market-value weighted index that measures the total return, including price and dividends, of 500 leading companies in leading industries in the U.S. economy. It is not possible to invest directly in this index. The Equity Growth Composite inception date is July 1, 2012 and creation date is October 1, 2016. Prior to 8/1/2018 this composite contained separately managed accounts.

Worm Capital, LLC ("Worm Capital") claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Worm Capital has been independently verified for the periods October 1, 2016 through December 31, 2020. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedure for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Equity Growth Composite has had a performance examination for the periods October 1, 2016 through December 31, 2020. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

The information presented prior to 10/1/2016 occurred while the Portfolio Management Team was affiliated with a prior firm, Alsin Capital Management, Inc. ("Alsin Capital"). Alsin Capital was independently verified for the periods July 1, 2012 through September 30, 2016. While the composite was at the prior firm it received a performance examination. The prior firm track record has been reviewed by an independent accounting firm and conforms to the portability requirements of the GIPS standards.

Worm Capital is a SEC registered independent investment adviser registered in accordance with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill of training. More information about Worm Capital, including investment strategies and objectives can be found in the firm ADV which is available upon request. A list of composite and pooled fund descriptions is also available upon request.

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, and capital gains. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile. Composite returns represent investors domiciled primarily in the United States. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any particular security and you should not assume that any security, sector, or holding discussed are or will be profitable, or that recommendations Worm Capital makes in the future will be profitable or equal the performance herein. Worm Capital reserves the right to modify its current investment strategies and techniques based on changing market dynamics or client needs.

The U.S. Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees from 7/1/2012 through 9/30/2016 and a hypothetical 10% annual performance fee subject to a high-water mark. Starting 10/1/2016 and through 7/31/2018, net of fee returns were calculated using a model 1.5% management fee that is accrued monthly and a hypothetical 10% annual performance fee subject to a high-water mark. Effective 8/1/2018, net returns are from The Worm Capital Fund, LP – Series B on a 1.5% management fee and 10% incentive fee schedule subject to a high water mark. These are net of accrued fund expenses as well as the management and incentive fees. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the net return of accounts in the composite the entire year prior to 1/1/17 and an equal-weighted standard deviation from 1/1/17 onward. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is 1.5% and a 10% annual performance fee subject to a high-water mark provision.

In a prior presentation, there was an error noted within the composite 3-year standard. The calculation had not reflected the net of all fee return, however, this has been corrected. WRC-20-09